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Abstract 
A strong reciprocal relationship has existed between Singapore Company 
Law (“SCL”) and the economy since Independence in 1965. Swift 
Parliamentary responses to economic events and successful implementation 
of Government policies has made it possible to clearly attribute cause and 
effect to statutory amendments and economic events in turn, proving the 
reciprocal relationship between the two. The first theme of this paper seeks 
to explain the fundamental characteristics of SCL that have resulted in such 
an unusually strong reciprocal relationship: the 1) Autochthonous nature of 
SCL; 2) Responsive nature of legislation; and 3) Government control at 
multiple levels of implementation. The second theme examines the interplay 
between 1) Domestic political and economic events; and 2) Foreign laws 
and economic events in influencing legislative responses over time and their 
impact on SCL. This will be done through an examination of four key areas 
of SCL over fifty years of Singapore economic history.  
A. Introduction  
This paper is organised around two main themes. The first theme seeks to explain the reasons 
behind the unusually strong reciprocal relationship between SCL (broadly defined including 
securities regulation) and the economy. Three fundamental characteristics of SCL have 
contributed to the smooth functioning of the reciprocal relationship. 1) The autochthonous 
nature of SCL: the law is free to develop according to the demands of commerce and 
increasingly without following uncritically the law in other jurisdictions. 2) The responsive 
nature of legislation: the Singapore legislative process is largely free from political deadlock 
and a strong parliamentary majority allows the Government to react to economic 
developments promptly. 3) Government control at multiple levels of implementation: the 
eventual implementation of a policy is aided by strong Government control at up to four 
levels of the implementation process (primary legislation, subsidiary legislation, Government 
agencies and possibly Government-linked Companies (“GLCs”)). 
 The second theme examines the interplay between two key factors that have shaped 
legislative responses to economic events and their changing influence over time. While the 
first part of this paper establishes that SCL can readily respond to economic events and 
ensure the implementation of the desired governmental policy, it leaves open the question of 
what factors influence the decision of whether a legislative response is warranted and the 
kind of policy to be implemented. While there are potentially an infinite number of causal 
factors motivating legislative reform, we have limited our focus to 1) Domestic political and 
economic events; and 2) Foreign laws and economic events, the two key factors which have 
tremendous influence on SCL. The influence of the factors has varied over time and also 
varied depending on the area of SCL concerned. This paper tracks the development of four 
key areas of SCL to explore the different extents of influence that the factors have had: 1) 
Regulation, 2) Insolvency, 3) Protecting Interested Parties, and 4) Directors’ Duties. 
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B. Singapore’s Legal and Economic History Post-Independence 
The examination of the two themes requires an in-depth consideration of both the legal and 
economic history of Singapore from Independence in 1965 to the present day. Economists 
and historians apply a variety of frameworks to attempt to identify various phases of 
Singapore’s economic development over time. When faced with this task, the lawyer 
naturally turns to Hansard to look for major statutory amendments as key milestones in legal 
history. Having identified these milestones, it is then necessary to look at the economic 
context in which these changes were made.  
For the purposes of this paper, we have structured the phases of development of 
Singapore’s legal history into four separate parts, tracking the implementation/enactment of 
milestone pieces of legislation that changed the landscape of SCL. Each of the key milestones 
took place following changes to the Singaporean economic background or as a result of the 
sudden occurrence of a major economic event. This section will introduce these milestone 
pieces of legislation, and will examine the events in Singapore economic history that provide 
the context in which these legal changes were made.  
 
Pre- 1967: Independence as a Catalyst for Legal Change1 
Before the 1960s, Singapore’s economy was virtually dominated by entrepot trade, with only 
a small manufacturing sector. 2  During this period, some government initiatives were 
implemented to help Singapore expand beyond entrepot trade. In 1956, the Singapore 
Polytechnic was established to remedy traditionally inadequate industrial training facilities.3 
The Economic Development Board (“EDB”) was formed in 1961 and tasked with attracting 
foreign investment.4  
Before 1967, the Companies Ordinance 1940 was in force in Singapore, an Act based 
on the English Companies Act 1929. Following the merger of Singapore and Malaysia in 
1963, Parliamentary draftsmen collaborated in the drafting of the Malaysian Companies Act 
(1965 Ed.). However, Singapore’s sudden independence in 1965 derailed the Act’s 
enactment, leaving Singapore with a company law framework thirty odd years behind 
English Company Law.  
                                                 
1  This paper focuses on Singapore legal and economic history post-Independence, where the reciprocal 
influence between SCL and the economy was clearly established. For a detailed analysis of pre-
Independence Company Law in Singapore and Malaysia see Petra Mahy and Ian Ramsay, “Legal 
Transplants and Adaptation in a Colonial Setting: Company Law in British Malaya”, [2014] S.J.L.S 123-
150. 
2  Peebles and Wilson, Economic Growth and Development in Singapore: Past and Future, (2002) (Edward 
Elgar), 26. 
3  W. G. Huff, The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century, (1994) 
(Cambridge University Press), 289. 
4  https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/edb/en/about-edb/company-information/our-history.html (accessed on 12 
January 2018). 
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1967-1985: Establishment of an SCL Framework 
Singapore’s independence from Malaysia caused a great sense of urgency in Parliament to 
implement an SCL framework, 5  and Parliament promptly held the first reading of the 
Companies Bill 1966 on 5 December 1966, a mere year after Independence. The first edition 
of the Singapore Companies Act (Cap. 50) was enacted in 1967 and came into force on 29 
December 1967. The Act was largely similar to the Malaysian Companies Act (1965 Ed.). 
This was in part by design and in part due to the time constraints under which the Act had to 
be passed. Mr E. W. Barker expressly stated in the third reading of the Companies Bill that 
“Singapore's new law relating to companies should not be different from the legislation in 
force in Malaysia in order to facilitate trade and commercial intercourse with and within this 
region.”6 Indeed, the idea of SCL being similar to Company Law elsewhere has broadly 
endured till today with England, and to a lesser extent, Australia, being a particular reference 
point. Singapore’s economic planners want SCL to resemble the law of a well-recognised 
jurisdiction so that foreign investors who establish companies in Singapore will be familiar 
and comfortable with the legal framework. 
Independence also led to a shift in Singapore’s economic planning. Following 
separation from Malaysia in 1965, there was no further prospect of a common market with 
Malaysia. Import substitution was rejected by the People’s Action Party (“PAP”) 
Government as impractical7 given the small domestic market and dearth of natural resources.8 
Instead, the PAP focused on export-led industrialisation that would be primarily funded by 
foreign investments. 9  This strategy placed a heavy emphasis on attracting Multinational 
Corporations (“MNCs”) to provide the necessary technology and capital10 and the use of 
state-owned enterprises to develop key sectors of the economy such as defence, transport and 
telecommunications.11  
Singapore’s focus on export-led industrialisation coincided with a global shift towards 
a new international division of labour. MNCs were actively searching for locations to set up 
assembly facilities for low value-added goods.12 Singapore positioned itself as a low-risk 
investment environment and passed legislation to minimise labour unrest and provide tax 
                                                 
5  Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (21 December 1966) (“Hansard 1966”) col 1073 (Mr E. 
W. Barker, Minister for Law and National Development). 
6  Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (21 December 1967) col 1035 (Mr E. W. Barker, Minister 
for Law and National Development). 
7 Gale Asia, The Papers of Lee Kuan Yew: Speeches, Interviews and Dialogues, (2011), “Growing Economic 
Links Between Singapore and Switzerland (1971)”. 
8  Peebles and Wilson (n 2), 186. 
9  Jean E Abshire, The History of Singapore, (2011), 134. 
10  Ravi Menon, “An Economic History of Singapore: 1965-2065”, 5 August 2015, available at 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Speeches-and-Monetary-Policy-
Statements/Speeches/2015/An-Economic-History-of-Singapore.aspx (accessed on 12 January 2018). 
11  Tan Cheng Han, Dan W Puchniak, and Umakanth Varottil, “State-Owned Enterprises in Singapore: 
Historical Insights into a Potential Model for Reform” (2015) 28 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 61. 
12  Ooi Giok Ling, “Singapore’s Changing International Orientations, 1960-1990”, in Singapore from Temasek 
to the 21st Century, Karl Hack and Jean-Louis Margolin (eds.), (2010), 333. 
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incentives.13  This strategy was highly successful and attracted a considerable transfer of 
capital investments and technical knowledge to Singapore. By 1972, Singapore’s cumulative 
stock of foreign direct investment stood at US$547 million.14 Further, beginning in 1965, the 
Singapore economy grew at 9 per cent annually.15 
After the Companies Act (1967) was passed, developments in SCL were relatively 
quiet, with minor amendments made to the Act on five occasions.16 For example, in 1970, an 
amendment was passed that required disclosure in the event of the acquisition or existence of 
substantial shareholding. In 1973, this was extended to require directors to disclose their 
beneficial ownership of securities in their companies. In 1974, this was further extended to 
require directors of listed companies to notify the Stock Exchange when acquiring or 
disposing of shares in their companies. By 1984, Parliament was ready to make further 
reforms to the Companies Act in order to keep pace with developments in the securities 
industry and capital markets.17  
 
1985-2000: Corporate Regulation and Insolvency Reform Following Economic Crisis 
Barely a year after the Companies Act (Cap. 50) (1984 Rev. Ed.) came into force, Parliament 
was forced to review the Act once again.18  This period got off to a rough start with a 
recession in 1985; the only time that the domestic economy contracted in the face of a 
growing global economy.19 To make matters worse, the collapse of Pan-Electric Industries 
forced the authorities to close the Stock Exchange of Singapore for the first and only time in 
its history and damaged Singapore’s reputation as a financial centre.20  
The crisis forced the authorities to temporarily close the Singapore stock exchange, 
and led to massive reforms in corporate regulation and insolvency. Parliament responded 
quickly by enacting the Companies (Amendment) Act 1987, which sought to remedy the 
weaknesses that had led to the crisis. A new framework was put in place to enhance the 
Government’s ability to regulate the stock market and stricter regulatory standards were 
enforced.21 Further amendments to tighten market regulation were subsequently made in 
                                                 
13  Abshire (n 9), 135-136. 
14  Lois Bastide, “Singapore in the New Economic Geography: From Geographic Location to the Relocation of 
Economic Dynamics”, in Gateways to Globalisation: Asia’s International Trading and Finance Centres, 
François Gipouloux (ed.), (2011), (Edward Elgar), 135. 
15  Ooi (n 12).  
16  The minor amendments were made in 1970, 1973, 1974, and twice in 1975. 
17  Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (17 January 1984) (“Hansard 1984”), col 343 (Prof. S. 
Jayakumar, The Acting Minister for Labour). 
18  See fn 94, infra. 
19  Menon (n 10). 
20  “Pan-Electric shock”, The Economist (London, England), Saturday, December 7, 1985, 78. 
21  Tan Chwee Huat, “Financial Institutions and Markets”, in Handbook of Singapore-Malaysian Corporate 
Finance, Tan Chwee Huat and Kwan Kuen-Chor (eds.) (1988), 23. 
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1989, 22  when there was more time for a comprehensive assessment of the regulatory 
regime.23  
An Economic Committee was also established in the wake of the 1985 recession and 
recommended that Singapore should develop as a risk management centre, conducting money 
market and capital market activities.24 This prompted the diversification of the Singapore 
economy, with reduced reliance on the traditionally dominant manufacturing industry. By 
2000, the financial sector accounted for nearly 12 percent of Singapore’s GDP,25 making it 
one of the most important sectors in the economy. 
 
2000 Onwards: Growing the Financial Services Industry 
The spectre of Pan-El continued to haunt corporate regulation for years after the incident. It 
was not until the 2000s that Parliament was confident enough with the regulatory framework 
to start reversing the trend of prescriptive regulation that had started post-Pan El. In 2001, the 
regulatory philosophy of the stock market underwent a major paradigm shift from merit-
based to disclosure-based regulation.26 
As Singapore persisted in its attempts to build up its financial services industry, she 
became more outward-facing in seeking foreign listings. For example, the Singapore stock 
exchange has been aggressively seeking listings from overseas firms.27 Chinese companies 
had in the past been the primary targets but other Southeast Asian countries have also been 
targeted.  
Singapore has been attempting to boost her attractiveness as a listing venue by 
attempting to counter the perception that the Singapore stock markets are over-regulated.28 It 
is unclear whether this strategy has paid off. One of the key issues that Singapore has also 
had to face in this area is her reputation as a financial centre. There has been some bad 
publicity arising from Singapore’s previous experience with some black sheep Overseas-
Listed Chinese Firms.29 In 2004, the Singapore Stock Exchange was rocked by the China 
                                                 
22  Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (7 April 1989) (“Hansard 1989”), col 103ff (BG George 
Yong-Boon Yeo). 
23  See “Reform of Corporate Regulation” in Section D below. 
24  Peebles and Wilson (n 2), 232. 
25  Ibid, 113. 
26  Jiang Yu Wang, “Making Singapore Company Law More Singaporean? –A Critical Examination of the 
Recent Revision of the Companies Act in the Light of Comparative Law”, 14 Asian Bus. Law. 15 (2014), 
15-36, 17. Merit-based regulation refers to a system where a regulator assesses securities being offered to the 
public. Disclosure-based regulation works by allowing market participants to make their own assessment of 
the securities being offered, based on information that firms are required to provide. See 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/annual_reports/annual20012002/developing-annual-c.html (accessed on 12 January 
2018).  
27  Sam Roseme, “Singapore’s Economic Balancing Act: How a Company’s Collapse Challenged the Country’s 
New Corporate Governance Regime”, (2007) 24 Pacific Basin Law Journal 249, 260. 
28  Ibid. 
29  See Peh Zu Hao, “Dealing with Perception: A Look at Overseas - Listed Chinese Firms in Singapore”, 
Centre for Banking & Finance Law, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore Working Paper 
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Aviation Oil scandal, where a company had to file for creditor protection after suffering 
massive losses from speculation in derivatives.30 As Singapore continues to focus on the 
financial services industry, new regulatory challenges such as whether to allow dual class 
shares constantly emerge. 31  The scene is an evolving one and a significant recent 
development was the establishment of Singapore Exchange Regulation Pte Ltd (“RegCo”). 
This new entity, established as a subsidiary of the Singapore Exchange (the current name of 
the Singapore Stock Exchange), came into operation on 15 September 2017. RegCo has taken 
over the regulatory functions of the Singapore Exchange leaving the latter to focus on its 
commercial role. Although RegCo is a subsidiary of the Singapore Exchange, it is intended to 
be independent of it. A majority of RegCo’s board members including the Chairman must be 
independent of Singapore Exchange and RegCo’s board is answerable to Singapore’s de-
facto central bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore, which is the overall regulator of 
Singapore’s capital markets. 
 
THEME I: EXAMINING THE RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP 
Law often influences economic (and more broadly, societal) events. Similarly, laws are 
constantly shaped by economic events as policy makers are forced to respond to them to 
maintain good governance. In practice, however, a badly drafted and implemented law will 
fail to effect the intention of Parliament and may lead to unforeseen repercussions. In the 
same way, a failure on the part of the Legislature to respond to economic events in a timely 
and apt manner limits the influence of economic events on shaping the law. Regulators may 
be left with a set of legal tools that are obsolete to the matter at hand. As demonstrated above, 
however, the Singapore Legislature has been extremely responsive to economic shocks. In 
this context, the success of legislative responses in Singapore to economic events is an 
indicator of the strong reciprocal relationship between SCL and the economy. 
 The reciprocal relationship is founded on three core characteristics of SCL. 1) The 
autochthonous nature of SCL; 2) the responsive nature of legislation; and 3) Government 
control at multiple levels of implementation. These characteristics have evolved over time 
and changed in nature. The path to autochthony took many years, with Singapore gradually 
becoming more confident of charting its own path in Company Law. On the other hand, the 
highly responsive nature of legislation has been a characteristic of SCL since Independence. 
While strong Government control has also been a constant feature of SCL, the increasing 
privatisation of GLCs has weakened Government control over the implementation of SCL 
                                                                                                                                                       
CBFL- WP PZH01, (6 February 2014), available at 
https://law.nus.edu.sg/cbfl/pdfs/working_papers/Peh%20Zu%20Hao%20Working%20PaperV2.pdf 
(accessed on 12 January 2018). 
30  Roseme (n 27), 250. 
31  Michelle Dy, “The Future of a Dual-Class Shares Structure in Singapore: Roundtable Discussion Report”, 
Centre for Banking & Finance Law, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, December 2016, 
report number CBFL-Rep-MD2, available at http://law.nus.edu.sg/cbfl/pdfs/reports/CBFL-Rep-MD2.pdf 
(accessed on 12 January 2018). 
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over time,32 raising questions as to the sustainability of the reciprocal relationship. At the 
present moment, however, the reciprocal relationship appears to be strong.  
 
C. Features of Singapore Company Law 
Autochthonous Nature 
SCL is progressively autochthonous 33  even as the Government is desirous of the legal 
framework being familiar to overseas investors. It allows Singapore law to develop in a 
manner which the Legislature deems to be the most appropriate, without being held back by 
the developments in other countries. While developments in foreign laws may have some 
influence on SCL, these developments are carefully assessed for their suitability and, where 
necessary, adapted to suit the local context.34 It is this element that allows for the reciprocal 
relationship between SCL and the economy. While law would certainly influence the 
economy in a non-autochthonous system, the influence of the economy on law would be 
more limited. An excessive reliance on foreign laws to direct the development of SCL in such 
a non-autochthonous system would impede the ability of the Legislature to respond to local 
triggers as they unfold. 
This was not always the case in Singapore. The path to autochthony was a long one, 
with Singapore initially starting out by copying foreign legislation wholesale. Pre-
Independence Company Law Legislation were often verbatim imports of the corresponding 
English statutes, with attempts to tailor the law to suit local conditions bearing very little 
fruit.35 In fact, so extreme was the practice of following the English legislation, that in section 
107 of the Companies Ordinance, the English numbering of sections was cross-referenced by 
mistake, instead of the Straits Settlements numbering.36 
 The Companies Act (1967 Ed.) substantially drew on the Malaysian Companies Act 
(1965 Ed.). However, Singapore had been involved in the drafting process, which broke the 
trend of blindly following English law by considering a wide range of precedents.37 The next 
                                                 
32  It is unclear to what extent GLCs are subject to Government control. For more on this point, see fn 65, infra. 
33  “Autochthonous is simply the Greek equivalent of the Latin “indigenous”. It means “of the land” and is 
something not imported; it means independent.” See Goh Yihan and Paul Tan, “An Empirical Study on the 
Development of Singapore Law”, (2011) 23 SAcLJ 176, 177. 
34  Ministry of Finance, Report of the Steering Committee for Review of the Companies Act (“Steering 
Committee Report”) (MOF, 2011), (1-28). 
35  See Mahy and Ramsay (n 1), 138, citing “New Companies Bill is One of Longest Gazetted”, The Straits 
Times (19 August 1939) 13. 
36  Ibid, citing H.G. Calvert, “Commercial Law” in George Williams Keeton and L.A. Sheridan, eds., Malaya 
and Singapore, The Borneo Territories: The Development of Their Laws and Constitutions, vol. 9 of The 
British Commonwealth: The Development of Its Laws and Constitution (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 
1961) 395 at 401. 
37  Mahy and Ramsay highlight that “[t]he drafting committee for the Malaysian legislation considered the 
English Companies Act 1948 (11, 12 Geo. VI, c. 38), the Australian Uniform Companies Acts 1961-1962, 
the U.K. Cohen and Jenkins Reports, and the draft code that had been prepared for Ghana (Malaysia, 
Parliamentary Debates, (9 August 1965)). The committee was assisted under the Australian Colombo plan, 
by Mr. John Finemore, Victoria’s Assistant State Parliamentary Draftsman”, see Mahy and Ramsay (n 1), 
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significant milestone occurred in 1974, when Singapore adopted several proposals from the 
1962 U.K. Jenkins Committee Report, which Westminster had rejected.38 In 1990, Singapore 
adopted the statutory derivative action ahead of Australia, Hong Kong and the UK.39  
By 2007, Singapore Company Law had matured enough for the Steering Committee 
of the 2007 Review of the Companies Act (the “Steering Committee”) to declare that 
foreign innovations should only be imported “if it would serve a useful purpose in our 
context”.40 The Steering Committee comprehensively reviewed the Companies Act in light of 
the legislation of other Common Law jurisdictions, submitting its report in April 2011.41 
Many of the proposed amendments were enacted in 2014, resulting in the largest overhaul of 
the Companies Act since independence42 and signalling that an autochthonous Company Law 
had come of age. 
 
Responsive Nature of Legislation 
The speed at which the Singapore Legislature has been able to respond to trigger events is 
another defining characteristic of SCL. Developments in the economy are often time-
sensitive and a lengthy feedback and legislative process would result in many proposed 
initiatives losing their effectiveness. The Singapore Legislature has constantly proceeded in a 
timely manner. A few examples illustrate this. 
Enactment of the Companies Act  
As noted above, when Singapore separated from Malaysia in August 1965, its Company Law 
statutory framework was more than thirty years out of date. While Parliament had to deal 
with the numerous pressing concerns arising from Singapore’s sudden independence, the 
Companies (Amendment) Bill was ready for its first reading within a year after Independence 
and enacted the following year.43  
Pan-El Crisis (Regulation) 
During the Pan-El Crisis, the Government promptly responded by closing the Stock 
Exchange of Singapore for three days, arresting the free fall which had been precipitated by 
the collapse of Pan-Electric Industries. 44  Within months of the Crisis, Parliament had 
                                                                                                                                                       
140, citing Geoffrey Boland, “The Magna Carta of Malaysian Company Law” The Straits Times (20 June 
1965) 6. 
38  Wang (n 26), 28. 
39  D. W. Puchniak, H Baum and M Ewing-Chow, The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 337. 
40  Steering Committee Report (n 34), (1-28). 
41  Ministry of Finance, Consultation Paper on the Report of the Steering Committee for Review of the 
Companies Act, (June 2011), at 1. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Hansard 1966 (n 5). 
44  Mimi Ho et. al., “Case Study on Pan-Electric Crisis”, (“MAS Paper”), MAS Staff Paper No. 32, June 2004, 
9.  
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prepared a Companies (Amendment) Bill which sought to remedy the weaknesses that had 
led to the crisis, proceeding to enact the amendments the following year.45 While further 
amendments had to be subsequently made in 1989, 46  Parliament chose to provide an 
immediate and adequate response to the Crisis, rather than to wait until a more 
comprehensive framework had been drafted.  
Pan-El Crisis (Insolvency) 
The Pan-El Crisis and the 1985 recession highlighted the inadequacies of the existing 
insolvency procedures. The insolvency regime at that point was “weighed in favour of 
creditors” 47  and wholly inappropriate in the background of a recession, where many 
companies suffered from temporary liquidity problems. When Parliament was addressing the 
issue of passing amendments to remedy the regulatory weaknesses exposed by the Pan-El 
Crisis and the recession, it also made changes to the insolvency regime.48 A major change 
was the introduction of judicial management as an alternative to winding-up.  
 
Government Control and Influence at Multiple Levels of Implementation 
The eventual implementation of a policy is aided by strong Government control at up to four 
levels of the implementation process. Primary legislation, subsidiary legislation, Government 
agencies and sometimes GLCs. The benefits of this level of control were twofold. Firstly, the 
Government could carefully control the implementation process and ensure that legislation 
was implemented in a manner consistent with the intention of Parliament. Secondly, by being 
involved in the commercial world, the Government constantly had “its ear on the ground” 
and was able to swiftly craft an appropriate response when a trigger event occurred.  
1st and 2nd Levels: Primary and Subsidiary Legislation 
The People’s Action Party’s (“PAP”) has enjoyed nearly complete control of Parliament 
since its decisive election victory in 1959. From 1968 to 1981, it was the sole party in 
Parliament.49 This can be explained by the strong support of the PAP by the left-leaning 
masses of workers, allowing it to pursue policies which catered to the development of 
Singapore while side-lining the rich, who had their own partisan interests.50 Since 1981, the 
PAP has never got less than 93 percent of all elected parliamentary seats at general 
elections. 51  This strong Parliamentary majority has allowed for the speedy passing of 
                                                 
45  Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (26 March 1967) (“Hansard 1967”) col 1518 (Dr Hu Tsu 
Tau, The Minister for Finance). 
46  Hansard 1989 (n 22). 
47  Catherine Tan Swee Kian, “The Judicial Management Procedure in Singapore Company Law”. J.B.L. 1988, 
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legislation without delays arising from deadlock or filibustering techniques in Parliament. 
Strong political support for the Legislature also allowed Parliament to freely enact policies 
which it deemed to best benefit Singapore, without being too concerned about the political 
impact.  
3rd Level: Government Agencies – The Role of EDB and Other Statutory Boards 
Statutory boards are separate corporate legal entities which are established by Acts of 
Parliament. 52  While controlled by the Government, in that they are regulated by and 
accountable to ministries, statutory boards are given considerable autonomy since they are 
not Government departments. A considerable number of such boards were set up by the 
government largely to aid economic and social development.53 Statutory boards were (and 
are) used to coordinate and otherwise support the Government’s initiatives. 
For instance, in 1961, the Economic Development Board (“EDB”) was set up to 
attract new businesses to Singapore and help the country attain her goals of creating a strong 
manufacturing sector.54 It helped foreign investors navigate the red tape and logistical issues 
in setting up businesses in Singapore and was in charge of administering several tax incentive 
schemes. In this sense, the EDB helped to ensure that the Government’s policies were 
implemented as they were intended even at the ground level, where businesses were 
concerned.  
4th Level: Government Influence on Companies 
When Singapore first began its route to industrialisation, the Government struggled with a 
lack of human capital. Local businesses had little experience in the manufacturing sector and 
the capital markets were far too underdeveloped to provide funding for them.55 To solve this 
problem, the Government was heavily involved in setting up new businesses and industries. It 
did this by aggressively courting MNCs, by strong state involvement in some economic 
sectors,56 and by working closely with large businesses in Singapore. As will be shown 
below, however, Government control has gradually weakened over the years as the 
Singaporean economy matures in favour of deregulation and privatisation. 
i. MNCs  
The importance of MNCs to Singapore’s industrialisation drive cannot be overstated. As a 
small country with no sizeable domestic market,57 Singapore adopted an export-orientated 
approach right from the beginning. Rather than establishing homegrown local industries, 
Singapore sought instead to court MNCs to set up operations in Singapore. This eliminated 
                                                 
52  Ow Chin Hock, “Development Strategies, Economic Performance, and Relations with the United States: 
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53  Ibid.  
54  Tan et. al. (n 11). 
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid. 
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the need to establish a market, since the MNCs had well-established market networks 
abroad.58 The use of MNCs in the development strategy had other advantages as well. MNCs 
would often bear the start-up risk of the new facility, bring in new technology and train the 
local workforce in the use of such technology.59 
In order to attract MNCs to establish their Asia-Pacific HQs in Singapore, the 
Government granted tax incentives and removed bureaucratic red tape. However, the 
Government also used these policies as a means of consolidating its control over the MNCs, 
making clear to the MNCs that the provision of these benefits were contingent on the 
beneficiary following Government policy. For example, the Government made it absolutely 
clear that MNCs had to have an export-oriented market. 60  Further “soft-control” was 
exercised by the close contact which MNCs had with EDB officers, who were tasked to 
aggressively court MNCs and respond to their needs. 
 The success of this strategy led to the Singapore economy becoming heavily reliant 
on MNCs. GDP contribution from foreign firms and residents increased from 15.7% in 1966-
1973 to 28.1% in 1979-1984.61 This was particularly pronounced in the manufacturing sector, 
where foreign investments made up 76.7% of all investments in manufacturing from 1972-
1986.62  
Concerns About Local Businesses 
However, the focus on MNCs has diminished over the years, especially in light of 
widespread complaints around 1985 about the “crowding out” of local entrepreneurs.63 In 
response, the EDB then increased its support for local enterprises, with a plan intended for 
Singapore to “grow its own MNCs”.64  
ii. GLCs65 
As noted above, in the early stages of Singapore’s industrialisation, the dearth of human and 
financial capital encouraged the Government to directly intervene in the economy and set up 
businesses in areas such as finance, transport, logistics and defence. Numerous GLCs were 
established in sectors which the Government felt were underdeveloped, 66  particularly 
                                                 
58  Ibid. 
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61  Ow (n 52), 68. 
62  Ibid. 
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between 1968-1972.67 Some estimated 505 GLCs (in 1986) have largely been held under 
three Government-controlled holding companies: Temasek Holdings, MDN Holdings, and 
Sheng-Li Holding Company.68 These GLCs have had various extents of public ownership 
over time.69  
Privatisation  
Over time, concerns emerged about the dominance of various GLCs and their impact on 
Singapore capital markets. The Singapore stock market had for some time been limited by the 
fact that the majority of the GLCs owned by the Government were not listed on the stock 
exchange. As an extreme example, in 1993, the bulk of daily trading was largely confined to 
eight stocks, given the limited nature of the market.70 This state of affairs was significantly 
contributed to by the delisting of the stocks of Malaysian companies from the Singapore 
Stock Exchange in 1989, since Malaysian companies accounted for 182 of the 329 stocks 
listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore and thirty-seven percent of its market 
capitalization.71 
 This scenario has been remedied partially by Government’s privatisation of a number 
of GLCs, to add depth to Singapore’s equity markets. By issuing shares to a large number of 
people, the Government has ensured a widespread distribution of capital.72  For instance, 
Singapore Telecommunications was privatised in 1993, and the Government sold a part of its 
equity in the company. 73  However, privatisation has been somewhat hampered by the 
Government’s concern that there are not enough local businessmen with enough capital to 
take over and run these companies.74 The Government has announced that its eventual goal is 
a more market-controlled economy with GLCs and statutory boards playing a smaller role.75 
iii. Large Local Companies 
Companies in certain sectors have been protected by the Government, allowing them to 
perform exceptionally well with a state-mandated oligopoly. Such protection had the effect of 
rendering these companies amenable to the control of the Government. The prime examples 
of these are the financial and banking sectors. 76  The banking sector in Singapore has 
traditionally been dominated by four main banking groups: the privately-owned Oversea-
Chinese Banking Corporation, United Overseas Bank and Overseas Union Bank groups, and 
the Government-owned Development Bank of Singapore.77 These local banking groups have 
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been protected by the Government in the sense that foreign competition in the banking sector 
was limited through policies restricting the number of foreign banks and what they could do 
(e.g. the opening of branches and automatic teller machines).78  
However, in the interests of developing Singapore into a global financial hub, the 
Government has since decided to open up the financial industry to more foreign banks. The 
protection offered by the Government has gradually been eroded, with the number of foreign 
banks rising sharply from 1981 to 1990 (from 86 to 128).79 
Conclusion on the Control Model 
The Government mechanisms explained above have allowed for the reciprocal relationship 
between SCL and the economy to flourish. The Government has clearly established control 
over the four levels of implementation, allowing them to pass legislation and then ensure that 
it is implemented in practice in the manner originally intended. It also allows for a strong 
feedback loop where policymakers are also kept aware of the changing conditions on the 
ground and are able to shape their policies accordingly. This is illustrated by the frequent 
reliance on senior executives from GLCs on review committees established by the 
government in SCL matters.80 Such involvement and feedback from executives of GLCs 
facilitates acceptance of changes to SCL. 
While it is not uncommon for governments to play an entrepreneurial role, Singapore 
is one of the few countries where the role has been played successfully.81 Unlike in systems 
which practice nationalisation, Singapore successfully established enterprises that created 
new wealth and jobs.82 
 Moving forward, it is clear that the level of governmental control has been changing 
over time. The PAP government went from occupying every seat in Parliament to the lowest 
level of 93%.83 By the standards of most developed democracies, this is still exceptionally 
high. There has been a drive to reduce the role of the statutory boards and GLCs in favour of 
market self-regulation. MNCs are also diminishing in importance in the Singaporean 
economy as the Government’s focus shifts to Small and Medium Enterprises (“SMEs”) in 
Singapore.  
Despite these changing trends, the Government continues to maintain a very high 
level of control over the implementation of its regulations and in in its engagement with local 
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businesses. There is no reason to doubt that the reciprocal relationship will continue, with the 
Legislature responding to trigger changes in the Singapore economy with policies that can be 
effectively implemented at every level.  
 
THEME II: FACTORS INFLUENCING LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
When the Government has decided to respond to a trigger economic event, the reciprocal 
relationship helps to ensure that its response will be implemented as intended. However, 
before this happens, a variety of factors will first influence the decision on whether to 
respond and if so, how to respond. While there are potentially an infinite number of causal 
factors motivating legislative reform, we have limited our focus to 1) Domestic political and 
economic events; and 2) Foreign laws and economic events, the two key factors which have 
had tremendous influence on SCL. The influence of these factors has changed over time and 
is very dependent on the particular area of SCL concerned. Four areas of SCL have been 
selected for review for the purposes of this study: 1) Regulation, 2) Insolvency, 3) Protecting 
Interested Parties, and 4) Directors’ Duties. 
 
D. Riding the Regulation Roller-Coaster: Changes in Singapore’s Regulatory Regime84 
The appearance of the first locally-formed joint stock companies in Singapore coincided with 
the period of rapid development of Singapore following its establishment as a trading post by 
Sir Stamford Raffles in 1819.85 Before 1930, share trading was usually done informally by 
stockbrokers in a little room in the Arcade at Raffles Place.86 Eventually, the Singapore 
Stockbrokers Association was formed in June 1930 to regulate the interest of the investing 
public and the conduct of its own members. 87  This was the precursor to the modern 
Singapore Exchange. On 23 May 1973, the Securities Industry Act 1973 was enacted 
alongside several other amendments to the Companies Act, forming the first modern 
regulatory framework for securities regulation in Singapore.88 
 The lack of a comprehensive regulatory framework for what appears to be an 
unusually long time can be explained by the nature of the domestic capital market in 
Singapore, which has traditionally had small capitalisation.89 This is due both to the limited 
pool of investors in Singapore (and the absence of a hinterland) and the requirement of 
compulsory savings under the Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) scheme, which locked up a 
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sizeable portion of available capital.90 In terms of equity capital markets, the MNCs and 
GLCs which dominated the Singapore economic scene (as noted above) often bypassed the 
domestic capital market in favour of foreign capital markets (for MNCs) and government 
funding (for GLCs). For debt capital markets, most MNCs preferred to rely on foreign 
funding such as loans and trade credits with their parent companies.91 GLCs have generally 
been profitable and have not required much debt financing.92 In addition, GLCs were not 
created through share issues and were largely held by one or more of the large government 
holding companies.93 
 In 1984, Parliament made some changes to the regulatory regime, including 
amendments to broaden the scope of insider trading provisions and strengthen the regulation 
of take-overs.94 However, barely a year after the Companies Act (Cap. 50) (1984 Rev. Ed.) 
came into force, Parliament was forced to review the Act once again due to the Pan-El Crisis. 
 
The Pan-Electric Crisis (“Pan-El”)95 
Pan-El was a marine salvage and construction company that got into financial trouble when it 
was unable to meet its debt obligations. Further investigations revealed that the company had 
entered into some S$280m of forward contacts in its shares that it could not honour.96 The 
financial collapse of Pan-El affected several stockbroking firms who were overtrading and 
over-extending loans.97 The worry was that this would set off a chain reaction that would 
result in stockbrokers, banks and minority shareholders losing practically all their 
investments.98 
 
Framework for Analysing the post-Pan-El Reforms 
In the wake of the Pan-El Crisis, Parliament reacted by enacting the Companies 
(Amendment) Act 1987 and the Securities Industry Act 1986,99 which sought to remedy the 
weaknesses that had led to the crisis.100 Corporate regulation mechanisms can be divided 
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along at least two lines. Firstly, there can be merit-based regulation - where a regulator 
assesses securities being offered to the public; and disclosure-based regulation - where 
market participants are allowed to make their own assessment of the securities being offered, 
based on information that firms are required to provide.101 Common law countries tend to 
rely more on market regulation than civil law countries, with the courts playing a more 
prominent role as well.102 Secondly, the disclosure of corporate information can be regulated 
by automatic disclosure - where firms are required to release certain kinds of information 
without the express demand of regulators; and reactionary disclosure - where parties are 
given legal powers to request specific information from firms.  
 
Reform of Corporate Regulation 
The Companies (Amendment) Act 1987 and Securities Industry Act 1986 provided the 
government with a framework to ensure that the Singapore stock exchange properly regulates 
the market.103 The two main areas of reform in corporate regulation were disclosure and audit 
requirements. For broking houses, minimum financial requirements were set through capital 
adequacy requirements104 and limits were placed on requirements for maintenance of reserve 
funds for firms.105 
Disclosure Requirements 
A new rule empowered 10 per cent of the members of a company or the holders of 5 per cent 
of the issued share capital to require the disclosure of the directors’ emoluments and benefits 
in an audited statement.106 Regulators were given the power to require local and foreign 
companies to produce company records, with mutilation or destruction of the documents 
being made an offence.107 In cases of commercial fraud, inspectors could order directors to 
produce their personal bank statements.108 The new regulatory regime was a far cry from the 
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limited powers of inspection provided for in the Companies Act (1967 Ed.), which a specially 
commissioned committee of the London Metropolitan Police found to be inadequate.109  
Audit Requirements 
The form and content of accounts were standardised, reducing the possibility of information 
being cherry-picked to present a misleading picture. 110  Directors were required to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the accounts were audited at least 14 days before the Annual 
General Meeting (“AGM”) and if the accounts were submitted on time, auditors would be 
guilty of an offence if the audit was not completed before the AGM.111 
 As Parliament had more time to reflect on the Pan-El Crisis, further amendments to 
the corporate regulatory regime were made by a further statutory amendment in 1989.112 
Public companies were required to establish a system of internal accounting controls and 
audit committees were mandated for listed companies.113 In addition, auditors were given the 
responsibility of reporting corporate fraud, with the enactment of a new rule requiring them 
to report actual or potential offences involving fraud or dishonesty.114 
 
Analysing the post-Pan-El Reforms 
The amendments made in the wake of the Pan-El Crisis may be analysed in light of the 
framework discussed above. The pre-1985 corporate regulatory regime was deficient in both 
merit-based and disclosure-based regulatory mechanisms. In terms of the framework of 
assessment, Singapore had a largely merit-based system at the time. However, regulation by 
the regulators may not have been particularly effective with the tools then available.  
The regulators had no real powers 115  and minority shareholders had little legal 
recourse other than a largely inapplicable oppression remedy 116  and a common law n 
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derivative action that was notoriously difficult to bring.117 Both automatic disclosure and 
reactionary disclosure were weak, with no mandated standards for presenting accounts and 
inadequate powers given to the regulators to demand information.118 With an information 
deficit, both regulators and shareholders not only lacked the ability to do anything about 
questionable practices, but were often completely ignorant of such practices in the first place. 
Even while external regulation was weak, self-regulation was completely non-existent. It is 
thus unsurprising that the corporate regulatory regime was completely unable to detect the 
fraud and questionable practices that had such an impact on the securities market.  
 The post-Pan-El reforms sought to improve disclosure and investor protection,119 
enhancing both automatic and reactionary disclosure of information by increasing audit and 
disclosure standards. The merit-based regulatory regime was improved, with regulators being 
given more powers to ensure compliance and auditors being tasked with highlighting 
fraudulent and dishonest practices. In the wake of the crisis, Parliament chose to err on the 
side of caution, enhancing the regulatory regime to the extent that there were concerns that 
Singapore would be at a disadvantage when compared to other financial centres like Hong 
Kong or Tokyo.120 
 
Concerns of Over-Regulation 
Although no new crises erupted in the years after the Pan-El Crisis, changes to the 
competitive landscape in Southeast Asia led to increasing worries about the possibility of 
over-regulation in Singapore. By 1993, Singapore’s regulatory regime was considered to be 
significantly more restrictive than that of any other Asian securities market.121 There were 
concerns that the Singapore financial authorities placed too much emphasis on stability and 
too little on growth.122 In light of the growth of aspiring financial centres in the region like 
Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan,123 Singapore faced the difficulty of 
having to balance prudent regulatory standards with international competition for capital. 
This was particularly difficult given that Singapore had the disadvantage of having a 
significantly smaller domestic market than those of its competitors. 
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Changing the Regulatory Regime  
Singapore moved from a merit-based regime for public companies to a disclosure-based one 
in 1997.124 She was heavily criticised for this at the time and even more so when the China 
Aviation Oil scandal broke out later.125 Under the merit-based regime, the regulator would 
decide which products would be allowed on the market.126 The switch to a disclosure-based 
regime allowed companies more freedom in this respect. The regulator’s focus would be on 
full and frank disclosure, with the onus on the investor to make informed decisions.127 
 The decision on whether to move from a merit-based to a disclosure-based regulatory 
regime required Parliament to carefully balance the interests of ownership and management 
of companies.128 The move eliminated the need for companies to receive approval from a 
regulatory agency prior to proceeding with a transaction,129 easing the regulatory burden on 
management. On the other hand, it required shareholders to more actively monitor the 
management of companies if they wished to safeguard their investments. Without a regulator 
to determine which transactions should be approved, shareholders would have to rely on the 
public disclosures filed by management to determine whether to intervene or to vote with 
their feet and sell their shares.  
The difficulty is that the disclosure-based model requires shareholders to be more 
vigilant in the oversight of the companies which they own. Some companies have a mindset 
of minimum disclosure, preferring not to give shareholders more information than what is 
expressly required under the regulatory regime. This has caused some problems since 
shareholders still tend not to ask for more information.130 Shareholder monitoring is weak 
where minority shareholders are dispersed and ultimately, the equity market in Singapore is 
dominated by the government, families and wealthy individuals.131 In the absence of activist 
institutional investors, these are not good conditions for encouraging shareholder monitoring.  
The effect of moving from a merit-based to a disclosure-based regulatory regime was 
to shift more power to majority shareholders. Whether this was an unintended consequence is 
unknown, but the side-effect of replacing regulatory supervision with market-supervision 
meant that shareholders with more voting rights would have more power to make decisions 
that would have been previously determined by the regulators. In light of the fact that the 
equity market in Singapore is dominated by the government, families and wealthy 
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individuals, there are concerns of a lack of safeguards for the rights of minority owners. This 
issue will be discussed subsequently in Section F of this paper.  
 
The CAO Crisis 
In November 2004, China Aviation Oil (“CAO”) filed for protection from its creditors after 
suffering losses from speculative derivatives trading totalling US$550 million.132  Despite 
legal requirements of continuous disclosure, the losses were not disclosed to the Singapore 
Exchange or captured in the company’s financial statements.133 The CEO of CAO, Chen 
Jiulin was found guilty to consenting to the non-disclosure and making of misleading 
statements and was jailed and fined.134 
 A few months after the CAO Crisis, the Singapore Stock Exchange announced that it 
would enhance its standards of governance and listings as part of “an annual review”.135 The 
focus of the new amendments was stated to be in enhancing corporate governance and 
extending the role of intermediaries.136 The CAO Crisis also appears to have triggered a 
change in the disclosure attitude of the MAS. Whilst they tended to emphasise the 
confidentiality of its dealings with financial institutions in the past, the MAS has provided 
increased information in the form of staff and information papers, and substantiated grounds 
for enforcement actions against financial institutions since the CAO Crisis.137  
The trend towards deregulation may simply have been temporarily derailed. The 
Chairman of the Singapore Stock Exchange stated in the company’s annual report that the 
CAO Crisis did not necessarily suggest that the regulatory regime was defective.138 As such, 
it is questionable whether the CAO Crisis has resulted in any long-term significant changes to 
the regulatory regime.  
 
Factors Affecting Legislative Responses 
Foreign Laws and Economic Events 
The Singapore regulatory regime has been influenced by a wide variety of various factors. In 
terms of foreign laws and economic events, Singapore’s move from a merit-based to a 
disclosure-based regulatory regime may have been influenced by increasing competition 
from other developing financial centres in Southeast Asia.139 Her drive to present herself as 
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not “overly-regulated” was also a direct result of the desire to attract Chinese companies to 
list in Singapore.140  
The CAO crisis illustrates the difficulties that Singapore faces in becoming a strong 
financial centre. While Singapore’s key selling point has been its strong regulatory regime, 
which inspires confidence in investors, 141  it must balance this against the demands of 
companies who may potentially want to list in Singapore. Standards of corporate governance 
in China are very different from Singapore and Chinese companies are often secretive and 
unwilling to adhere to the transparency standards of Western countries.142 Moving forward, it 
appears that Singapore will continue to adjust her regulatory regime depending on foreign 
laws and economic events, especially since the focus has shifted from China to Southeast 
Asia in terms of courting companies to list in Singapore.  
Domestic Political and Economic Events 
As for domestic political and economic events, the immediate responses to the Pan-El and 
CAO Crises demonstrate the paramount influence which domestic developments have on 
SCL. In contrast to foreign laws and economic events, which were responded to over time, 
the legislative responses to domestic events were generally swift and bold, no doubt 
reflecting the immediacy of the impact domestic events can have on the local economy and 
the need to manage any potential political fallout from disgruntled investors. 
 
E. Rising from the Ashes: Insolvency Policy as a Tool for Growth 
The Companies Act (1967 Ed.) has provided for an insolvency regime since its earliest 
incarnation. The Companies (Winding-Up) Rules 1969 have been in existence for nearly as 
long. However, there were no major developments to the insolvency regime until 1984 and 
the Pan-El Crisis in 1985, which coincided with a recession. The reform of the insolvency 
regime was perhaps not seen as much of a priority due to the focus of the Government at the 
time. From 1967 to 1984, Singapore focused on attracting foreign investments and courting 
MNCs to set up operations in the country. The Government also set up numerous GLCs.  
A study conducted around 1978 revealed that not a single MNC’s business had failed 
in Singapore.143 It revealed that wholly-owned foreign enterprises from the US, Europe and 
Japan had a failure rate of only 6%.144 One can thus see why insolvency reform was not a 
priority at this point. The most important companies to Singapore’s economy at the time had 
a very low risk of insolvency, reducing the importance of a well-developed regime to deal 
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with such situations. As for GLCs, they were largely managed by the Government and strong 
insolvency legislation was not required to deal with the case if they went insolvent. 
The pre-Pan-El insolvency regime has been described as “weighed in favour of 
creditors”.145 Companies with temporary liquidity problems were subject to the mercy of its 
creditors and sometimes forcibly wound up.146 1985 marked the beginning of a shift towards 
a more debtor-friendly system. The recession also highlighted the changes in the economic 
climate. With the rising cost of labour acting as a disincentive to foreign firms, Singapore 
could no longer predominantly rely on foreign investment to create jobs. The Government 
adapted its economic strategy to focus, inter alia, on the promotion of innovation, enterprise 
and entrepreneurship.147 The 1985 amendments to the insolvency regime were in-line with 
these objectives as they were intended to encourage entrepreneurship and healthy risk-taking, 
leading to a climate more conducive to corporate rescue.148 
 
Framework for Understanding Insolvency Policy 
Insolvency policy focuses on balancing the various conflicts of interest at play when a 
company is teetering on the brink of collapse. The company management is likely to be slow 
to recognise an inevitable end149 and in fact have an incentive to attempt to trade its way out 
of the crisis regardless of the odds. They lose nothing if the company eventually becomes 
insolvent, but stand to gain if they successfully keep it alive. This incentivises the company 
management to take more risks than would otherwise have been prudent.150 On the other 
hand, creditors have an incentive to force payment as quickly as possible, attempting to 
secure an advantage over other creditors.151 Creditors may not be willing to bear the risks of 
rehabilitating a company if they can secure (even at a fraction) payments by forcing a 
liquidation. The result of these conflicts of interest is the need for a neutral system to manage 
affairs and maximise aggregate welfare. 
 
The Repeal of Automatic Disqualification of Directors 
Another aspect of insolvency policy is the extent to which directors and other senior 
management are held to account for a failed business enterprise. In 1984, a particularly 
controversial amendment was passed with the intention of preventing abuse of the corporate 
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form.152 In one of the rare occasions documented in Hansard, several Members of Parliament 
vehemently objected to this amendment,153 which provided for the automatic disqualification 
of directors from other directorships if they were on the boards of two insolvent companies 
which had gone into liquidation within five years of one another.154  The provision was 
arguably intended to pre-empt and prevent the practice of establishing phoenix companies. 
When a company goes insolvent, its former directors may simply set up another company 
with a similar name to benefit from the goodwill of the previous firm, whilst avoiding its 
liabilities.155 While the amendment may have had the effect of weeding out unfit directors, it 
also had the potential to disqualify directors who were merely unlucky enough to join the 
boards of two failing companies. Leave of court could be obtained to certify one as fit to be a 
director again, but the unfortunate director was left to bear the consequences of the 
disqualification applying in the interim.156 The grave impact of the automatic disqualification 
provision was felt within a year. The timing of the amendment could not have been worse, 
for the 1985 Pan-El Crisis and the recession hit with full force shortly after it was passed, 
rendering numerous companies insolvent and affecting a considerable number of directors.  
 Throughout the entire saga, Parliament seems to have completely missed the point of 
disqualifying directors in the first place. A disqualification regime should be designed to 
protect shareholders from directors who are unfit to manage. An automatic disqualification 
provision is both under and over-inclusive as it fails to consider the significant element of 
chance. It will leave out directors with appalling management skills whose companies 
somehow managed to survive, while catching potentially brilliant directors who just 
happened to be on the boards of several companies in a severe recession. The key factor of 
the soundness of the management decisions is weakly assessed through the proxy of whether 
the company is liquidated, while the irrelevant considerations of chance and the number of 
companies heavily influences the disqualification.  
 Automatic disqualification was not only conceptually unsound but completely at odds 
with the strategy of promoting local entrepreneurship. By 1987, Parliament acknowledged 
that a court order should be required for disqualification and repealed automatic 
disqualification.157 Currently, the position stands that directors are disqualified only where a 
court order to that effect has been made or they have been convicted of certain criminal 
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offences.158 This is a more refined approach to protecting shareholders and safeguarding 
against the abuse of corporate form. 
 
The Introduction of Judicial Management 
The birth of judicial management in Singapore is directly attributable to the Pan-El Crisis.159 
The prolonged state of limbo that Pan-El was in before its eventual liquidation highlighted 
the inadequacies of the existing insolvency procedures, prompting the Government to 
introduce a new mechanism.160 The intention was to preserve viable businesses and protect 
them from creditors until they could be restored to profitability.161 To achieve this goal, the 
law provided for the appointment of an independent qualified judicial manager to run the 
business in the best interests of the company and its creditors,162 relieving the directors of 
their control163 and shielding the company from the conflicts of interest that might otherwise 
sink it. It has been said that the Pan El crisis and the 1985 recession contributed to a 
commercial environment more conducive to entrepreneurship and healthy risk-taking.164 
While the intentions of introducing the judicial management regime in Singapore may 
have been good, its effectiveness has been somewhat questionable. In 2013, the Report of the 
Insolvency Law Review Committee (“ILRC”) noted that there are few reported success 
cases where judicial management has been applied and that the majority of applications for 
judicial management filed in the courts have not been granted. 165  However, the ILRC 
acknowledged that judicial management still has a role to play in Singapore’s insolvency 
regime, particularly in cases where there is a need to realise or maximise the value of 
corporate assets that would be extinguished or devalued in the event of liquidation.166 Thus, 
they proposed retaining it, but with certain reforms to address its deficiencies.167  
 
An International Insolvency Hub 
In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and growing demand for restructuring work in 
the Asia Pacific region,168 the Government spotted an opportunity for Singapore to position 
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itself as a leading insolvency and debt restructuring centre.169 Two committees comprised of 
insolvency experts were commissioned to help achieve this170 and their recommendations 
included several changes such as the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency and the reform of the current judicial management regime. 171  The 
recommendations are expected to be reviewed by Parliament and enacted progressively 
within a few years. 172  The establishment of Singapore as an international centre for 
insolvency and debt restructuring is intended to enable insolvency to be an engine for 
economic growth in Singapore in a very different way and will mark the next stage of the 
development of insolvency law in Singapore.  
 However, there have been concerns about the way that SCL has been reformed and 
the potential effectiveness of the new insolvency regime. As part of the reform, Singapore 
adopted significant parts of the United States Chapter 11 framework.173 However, given the 
complexities of Chapter 11 and the need to add parts of the Chapter 11 framework to the 
established Singapore insolvency regime, it is uncertain whether Singapore will succeed with 
the new regime.174 Further, there are questions of whether the Chapter 11 framework is even 
appropriate for Singapore in the first place.175 It may be that the policy makers are aware of 
this but are adopting the time tested practice of adapting a familiar international framework in 
SCL to engender confidence in an area that Singapore intends to grow. It highlights the limits 
of autochthony faced by a small country that is dependent on commerce for her lifeblood. 
Care must be taken to ensure that foreign legal imports are compatible with the domestic 
system while retaining the essence of what is being adopted. 
 
F. International and Regional Influence and Reputation: Protecting Interested Parties 
Arguably, the control of a company rests in the hands of the majority shareholders, either 
directly through exercise of their voting rights at a company general meeting, or more 
importantly, indirectly through their ability to appoint and remove directors. However, 
majority shareholders are not the only group who may have an interest in a company. 
Creditors and minority shareholders are, inter alia,176 other interested parties who will be 
significantly affected by the decisions of the majority shareholders with respect to the 
company. Thus, Company Law provides for several safeguards to ensure that these interested 
parties are protected from the untrammelled control of the majority shareholders over the 
company. These safeguards include capital maintenance regulations which address the 
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tension between creditors and shareholders with respect to the allocation of a company’s 
capital. 177  Without sufficient capital maintenance regulations, shareholders (who are 
generally in a position of control) can make distributions to themselves, reducing the pool of 
capital in the company that is potentially available to creditors.178 This section studies the 
evolution of such safeguards over Singapore’s economic history.  
The main developments in these safeguards occurred relatively later than those for 
regulation and insolvency. Singapore was an established financial centre by the 1970s but 
increased competition from other regional financial centres significantly intensified in the late 
1990s and early 2000s.179 It was during this period that Singapore began to significantly relax 
its capital maintenance regime. At the same time, with a less prescriptive regulatory regime 
following the adoption of a more disclosure based system, Singapore started to place more 
emphasis on protecting minority shareholders.  
 
The Statutory Derivative Action  
The first milestone of safeguards reform occurred in 1993, with the enactment of a statutory 
derivative action. While the common law derivative action did exist in Singapore at the time, 
the considerable difficulties posed by the rule in Foss v Harbottle applied to Singapore 
common law as well180 and Parliament recognised this.181 Initially, the statutory derivative 
action was limited to unlisted companies on the basis that listed companies were already 
subject to extensive central regulation and disgruntled shareholders could readily sell their 
holdings on the open market. 182  Parliament was concerned that extending the statutory 
derivative action to listed companies would encourage minority shareholders to make 
frivolous applications and open the floodgates of litigation.183 The statutory derivative action 
was only extended to listed companies in 2014, on the advice of the Steering Committee184 
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that frivolous applications would likely be minimal due to the prospect of having to pay the 
legal costs of the application.185 
 
The Introduction of Share Buy-Backs 
The next milestone occurred in 1998, when Parliament introduced an amendment allowing 
companies to buy-back their own shares using distributable profits without the need for court 
approval. 186  This was one of the effects of Singapore moving from a merit-based to a 
disclosure-based regulatory regime in 1997. Parliament noted that share buy-backs provided 
certain advantages over capital reduction procedures in terms of flexibility and efficiency,187 
advantages which led several of Singapore’s larger corporations to consider and push for the 
approval of such schemes.188 The key driving force for the amendment was the increased 
competition from other financial centres, as Parliament noted that Singapore was behind the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand in that it lacked 
some form of share buy-back procedure.189  
The scope of the share buy-back provisions were extended in 2000 to include 
preference shares190 and again in 2005, when companies were allowed to buy-back shares 
using profits or paid-up capital, instead of only distributable profits.191 As permitting share 
buy-backs potentially increased the risk of disadvantaging creditors, Parliament introduced a 
solvency test, which made directors’ personally liable if they approved share buy-backs 
knowing that it would result in the insolvency of the company.192  
 
The 2005 Major Reforms 
Safeguards underwent a massive paradigm shift in 2005, with numerous amendments being 
made to modernise the regime and abolish what were perceived to be outmoded relics of the 
past. The concepts of par value and authorised capital were removed from the legislation on 
the grounds that they were highly inaccurate proxies for value and served no useful 
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purpose.193 An alternative capital reduction regime was also instituted, allowing companies to 
reduce their share capital without the need for Court approval. 194  Instead, a special 
shareholders’ resolution would suffice, provided that it was supported by a solvency 
statement from the company’s directors.195  
Financial assistance restrictions were also liberalised, with companies allowed to 
provide such assistance, provided that it did not exceed 10% of the paid-up capital and 
reserves of the company, or there was unanimous shareholder approval. 196  Once again, 
Parliament attempted to protect shareholders through a disclosure-based mechanism, where 
directors were required to make a solvency statement that would result in criminal penalties if 
made without reasonable grounds.197 In 2014, financial assistance was eventually made even 
easier by the introduction of a new “material prejudice” exception that provided that financial 
assistance by a public company or a subsidiary of one was not prohibited so long as, inter 
alia, it did not materially prejudice the interests of the company, its shareholders and the 
claims of its creditors and the terms of assistance were fair and reasonable to the company.198 
The financial assistance prohibition for private companies was completely abolished.  
Greater reliance was placed on disclosure-based mechanisms, with the Companies 
(Amendment) Act 2014 introducing a new procedure for financial assistance in s 76(9AB). 
To safeguard shareholders, s 76 of the Companies Act (2006 Rev. Ed.) provides that a 
company may not provide financial assistance in connection with the acquisition of its own 
shares.199 Before 2014, there were limited exceptions to the s 76 rule, involving the making 
of a solvency statement by directors and a whitewash procedure of shareholders passing a 
special resolution. 200  The new s76(9AB) procedure simplifies matters considerably by 
allowing financial assistance in cases where the directors pass a resolution that the company 
should give the assistance, provided that the terms of the assistance are fair and reasonable to 
the company and the interests of the company, shareholders and creditors are not materially 
prejudiced.201 
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2014: Taking Flexibility to the Next Level  
By 2014, Singapore was starting to feel significant pressure to introduce more flexibility into 
its capital markets regulation. Leading bourses like the New York Stock Exchange and The 
London Stock Exchange had allowed dual-class share (“DCS”) structures for listed 
companies for years, making them an attractive listing location for tech companies in 
particular, which have tended to prefer such structures.202 In contrast, the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange had lost the listing of Alibaba to the New York Stock Exchange due to its 
unwillingness to remove or allow the circumvention of its ban on DCS.203 The loss of one of 
the largest ever initial public offerings on the basis of this single point weighed heavily on the 
minds of Parliament, which was already under pressure on this issue due to reports that 
Manchester United had supposedly given up attempts to list in Singapore due to the 
prohibition on DCS.204 Parliament eventually amended the law to allow for DCS for public 
companies in addition to private ones.205 The issue thus shifted to the Singapore Exchange to 
determine whether to allow DCS structures to list on the Exchange. 
 The Singapore Exchange was understandably uncertain as to this decision. 206 
Singapore‘s previous experience with some black sheep Overseas-Listed Chinese Firms has 
not done its reputation any favours207 and there are concerns that allowing dual class shares 
may not be in Singapore’s interest as a financial centre. 208  On the other hand, some 
academics and practitioners have been more positive about dual class shares, with the general 
consensus being that it may be worth allowing them so long as proper safeguards and 
regulations are put in place to manage the risks.209 The Singapore Exchange has launched a 
public consultation exercise on whether to allow companies with DCS structures to be listed 
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on the Exchange. 210  The outcome of the consultation is still uncertain. The Singapore 
Exchange has also sought the advice of the SGX Listing Advisory Committee (“LAC”) on 
this issue, which overwhelmingly voted in favour of permitting DCS structures to list on the 
Exchange.211 However, the LAC advised that such structures should only be permitted if 
there is a compelling reason for it.212 Thus, although there should be the flexibility to offer 
DCS listings when the right company comes along, companies with DCS structures are not 
intended to and are unlikely to become the norm in Singapore. 
 
Factors Affecting Legislative Responses 
Foreign Laws and Economic Events 
Due to a small domestic capital market, Singapore’s success as a financial centre was highly 
dependent on its ability to attract foreign firms and capital.213 As such, the Government has 
always been cognisant of the need to evaluate Singapore’s safeguards vis-à-vis the 
competition and ensure that it remains attractive to investors and potential listing companies. 
This involves a delicate balancing act. It is crucial to ensure that safeguards are not 
excessively strict as to drive away potential listing companies and simultaneously, offer 
sufficient protection to investors to avoid a reputation of being a weak regulator beholden to 
the interests of companies and majority shareholders. In practice, international pressures have 
resulted in a constant softening of what were once seen as necessary safeguards. This is in 
line with global trends as well, as competition for mobile capital intensifies.214 
The strongest indication of the sheer influence which foreign laws and economic 
events have on safeguards in Singapore is probably Singapore’s recent shift to permit DCS 
structures through an amendment to the Companies Act. Despite numerous concerns about 
the risk to Singapore’s reputation, Singapore’s Parliament has decided to remove the legal 
impediment.  
Domestic Political and Economic Events 
The influence of domestic political and economic events on safeguards in Singapore can be 
seen by the close relationship between the development of the Singapore domestic capital 
markets and capital maintenance regulations. Before the 1970s, limited domestic capital 
markets corresponded with few changes to the regulatory regime. Thereafter, with increased 
privatisation of GLCs and the permission to use CPF funds to invest in certain shares, 
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domestic capital markets expanded, with a corresponding increase in the rate of 
developments of the regulatory regime.215 
 
G. Toeing a Visible Line: Rethinking Directors’ Duties  
Traditionally, the law on directors’ duties in Singapore essentially followed the English 
position, which focused heavily on common law rather than statute. However, when the first 
edition of the Companies Act was enacted in 1967, it drew heavily on the 1965 Malaysian 
Companies Act, which itself followed the Australian model of directors’ duties. Under the 
Australian model, common law and statute imposed concurrent and sometimes overlapping 
duties on directors.216 Thus, while directors’ duties under SCL had a statutory framework, it 
was also able to benefit from developments in English jurisprudence as the latter evolved. 
The main difference between the two sources of law was that the common law duties could 
be contracted out of under certain conditions whilst statutory duties were binding regardless 
of any agreements to the contrary.217 
 
Codification 
The U.K. eschewed the codification of common law directors’ duties until 2006, when 
Westminster finally reversed this long-standing position, adopting amendments that had the 
effect of completely replacing any common law duties in this area with statutory duties. The 
common law was relegated to the role of clarifying the statutory duties and aiding in their 
interpretation.218 
 After nearly fifty years of gradual and minor changes to Singapore’s directors’ duties 
legislation, the two approaches of complete codification and the Australian model were 
subjected to detailed scrutiny when the Steering Committee evaluated whether to codify 
directors’ duties in 2011. 219  The Steering Committee eventually recommended against 
codification on the grounds that “that such a move would inhibit judicial development in a 
particularly dynamic area of law.”220 The core structure of directors’ duties legislation in 
Singapore remained unchanged for an extraordinary period of time, especially when assessed 
in light of the developments in regulation, insolvency and capital maintenance law within the 
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same period. However, it is not difficult to see why Parliament was comfortable with the 
status quo.  
In a sense, Singapore had the best of both worlds by adopting the Australian model. 
She was able to avail herself of the latest developments in the law on directors’ duties, which, 
as the Steering Committee noted, tended to develop rather rapidly. On the other hand, having 
a coexisting statutory framework enabled Parliament to directly intervene to remedy 
weaknesses and gaps in the common law. The English common law could not be expected to 
take into account the local conditions in Singapore and the relatively low volume of litigation 
in Singapore meant that uncertainty would persist until such issues specific to Singapore 
found their way into the local courts.  
 The price to pay for such flexibility was some uncertainty as to the exact scope of 
directors’ duties and how the law would be applied. Without an exhaustive list of duties 
which directors could refer to, legal advice would have to be sought more often, creating 
transaction costs. However, it is not clear that the English model has fared any better since 
directors’ duties were codified there in 2006. The inherent open texture of legal language221 
and the inability of Westminster to predict changing circumstances have meant that it is 
currently still impossible to form any sound legal position just by looking at the UK 
Companies Act 2006 alone. 222  The English statutory provisions must still be read in 
conjunction with the common law, raising questions on whether codification has actually 
made the law more accessible to the lay public. If not, the more flexible Australian model 
would probably still be a better choice.  
As to whether there may come a point where directors’ duties have crystallised such 
that codification may become a more attractive option, the U.K.’s experience with 
codification does not encourage other jurisdictions to follow its lead. The loss of flexibility in 
such a system seems poorly compensated by any corresponding gains in “legal certainty”. 
There has been a call, however, for some statutory intervention to enact a formal business 
judgment rule, which would serve to clarify the law and help directors avoid breaching their 
duties.223 
 
The s 407 General Penalty Provision 
Walter Woon has singled out s 407 of the Companies Act (2006 Rev. Ed.) for criticism, 
noting that it is far too broad, given that it provides that the failure to comply with any 
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provision of the Act is an offence.224 The Steering Committee recommended that the general 
penalty provision in s 407 be repealed and that Parliament individually assess the appropriate 
penalty for each contravention of the Act.225 Section 407 has its origins in the Australian 
Companies Act 1961, which was adopted in the Malaysian Companies Act of 1965. From 
there, it found its way into the first edition of Singapore’s Companies Act in 1967. 
 Australia has amended the General Penalty Provision to reference a Schedule which 
provides for specific penalties for each of the offences in the Australian Corporations Act 
2001. 226  In contrast, Malaysia has retained the General Penalty Provision in her latest 
amendment to her Companies Act in 2016 in s 588. The Steering Committee’s proposal to 
repeal s 407 was not adopted by Parliament in the Companies (Amendment) Act 2014. It is 
possible that Parliament considered the change to be of little practical significance, given that 
the section is almost never used to prosecute where there has been no resulting loss to the 
company or the general public.227 
 
Imposing Criminal Liability on Directors 
Singapore’s directors’ duties regime provides for criminal penalties in certain situations. In 
recent years, leading practitioners and academics have raised the issue of whether criminal 
penalties are warranted for the breach of these duties, some of which are merely regulatory 
offences.228 One potential consideration might be whether the “legal compass” is in fact 
aligned with the moral compass; in other words, whether the law imposes criminal penalties 
on directors for acts which can reasonably be said to be morally wrong. Walter Woon has 
expressed this concern in the statement that “one does not go to jail for the sins of others”, 
noting that as a general guide, criminal liability should only be imposed in cases of egregious 
failures to act or dishonesty.229 The Steering Committee has echoed this sentiment in their 
Report published in 2011.230 
Of the offences provided for in the Companies Act (2006 Rev. Ed.), criminal liability 
is easy to justify for some. Directors who fail to disclose personal conflicts or interests in 
transactions are liable to be fined and/or jailed.231 They may also be subject to imprisonment 
if they deliberately sign off on the company’s financial statements knowing that the 
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statements are not a true and fair reflection of the company’s financial state.232 A more 
dubious case would be where a director fails to fine an annual return.233 
The s 157 Duty of Due Diligence Provision 
One area where SCL completely departs from English law in terms of both statute and the 
common law is the imposition of criminal liability on directors should they breach their duty 
of diligence. Under s 157 of the Singapore Companies Act (Cap. 50) (2006 Rev. Ed.), a 
director who fails to use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of his office may 
not only be subject to civil penalties, but may also be liable to both a fine and imprisonment. 
Once again, s 157 of the Singapore Companies Act has its origins in the Australian 
Companies Act 1961, finding its way into SCL through the Malaysian Companies Act of 
1965.  
The Steering Committee’s report notes that other jurisdictions such as New Zealand 
and the UK have already taken steps to decriminalise breaches of duties of diligence.234 
Significantly, even Australia, from which Singapore derived s 157 in the first place, has 
removed the prospect of criminal penalties from their corresponding section.235 On the other 
hand, Malaysia has retained their corresponding provision of s 157 (under s 213 of the 
Malaysian Companies Act 2016) in their recent amendment to their Companies Act. Some 
industry players have suggested that the prospect of criminal liability may have an impact on 
the willingness of competent directors to serve on corporate boards.236 However, the Steering 
Committee eventually recommended that criminal penalties under s 157 be preserved so as 
not to send the wrong signal and encourage misconduct.237 
 However, as Victor Yeo notes, in handing down its recommendation, the Steering 
Committee did not distinguish between the various duties covered by s 157.238 The section 
has two subsections, the first of which requires a director to act honestly and use reasonable 
diligence in the discharge of the duties of this office, and the second of which requires a 
director not to make improper use of his position in the company or any information acquired 
through that position. It is submitted that for an offence to pose imprisonment as a potential 
penalty, some sort of moral culpability ought to be required as part of the mens rea of the 
offence. The serious consequences of imprisonment make it exceedingly harsh to expose 
directors to the risk of it for mere regulatory offences or negligence. In this aspect, the 
recommendation of the Steering Committee that criminal penalties under s 157 should be 
retained may be defensible, but only in cases where a director has acted dishonestly. The 
breach of a duty of diligence can be addressed through the use of civil remedies alone, which 
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are better suited for ensuring that the company is adequately compensated.239 This would also 
put Singapore’s position on the issue in line with those of the Commonwealth jurisdictions 
highlighted above.  
In any case, it is noted that shareholders cannot bring a criminal action against the 
directors themselves, even in the event of a clear breach of the duty of diligence. While 
shareholders may bring a civil action (either with the support of the board of directors or 
through the derivative action), only the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority 
(“ACRA”) may commence criminal proceedings against errant directors. In practice, such 
proceedings are only brought in serious cases where shareholders have suffered serious losses 
and the directors can be said to be morally culpable to some extent.  
 
Factors Affecting Legislative Responses 
Foreign Laws and Economic Events 
It is interesting to note that directors’ duties is the one area of SCL in this paper that has been 
affected by foreign laws and economic events to a very small extent. Since the Australian 
model of directors’ duties was adopted in 1967 (the first edition of the Singapore Companies 
Act), there have been very few changes to the regulatory regime, despite the fact of numerous 
changes overseas. For example, SCL in this area remained unchanged when the UK codified 
its directors’ duties in 2006, and when other Commonwealth jurisdictions abolished general 
penalty provisions and criminal liability for breach of the duty of diligence.  
One potential reason for the lack of foreign influence in this area is that unlike capital 
markets regulation or protection of interested parties, which require competitive frameworks 
to attract foreign investment, directors’ duties really only potentially affect a very small 
number of foreign directors. Further, the practical impact of s 157 has been very limited due 
to the fact that it is not commonly used, and even when it is, imprisonment is rarely handed 
down as a sentence. Thus, imprisonment is more of a theoretical possibility than a real risk. 
In addition, the common law and equitable rules that underlie this area are highly developed 
and the statutory framework does not intend to derogate from such rules. 
Domestic Political and Economic Events 
It would appear that domestic political and economic factors have had a far stronger impact 
in this area of SCL. Longstanding local fears of sending the wrong signal and encouraging 
misconduct have discouraged Parliament from reforming some of the harsher points of the 
regulatory regime. There has also been considerable inertia in this area of SCL, in that there 
appears to be a reluctance to disrupt the status quo, especially since no major issue has yet 
arisen from any problems with the regulatory regime. The Steering Committee’s 
recommendation that the s 407 general penalty provision be repealed has not been adopted, 
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which is made all the more stark when we consider the number of their recommendations that 
have been adopted by Parliament in the other areas of SCL covered in this paper.  
 
H. Power Shift Among Sources of Influence Over Time  
As a small nation, Singapore is heavily reliant on trade and investment flows with foreign 
jurisdictions. The dominating influence of foreign laws and economic events arises out of the 
need to constantly keep Singapore as an attractive trading partner and investment destination. 
The greater the need to overcome Singapore’s small size, the greater the pressure to submit to 
changes in foreign jurisdictions. Thus, due to Singapore’s small domestic capital markets, 
regulations and safeguards protecting interested parties have had to be carefully calibrated. 
There is a natural tension between large controlling shareholders who can make the decision 
of whether to list in Singapore and the many other smaller investors who must decide 
whether Singapore has stringent enough measures to protect their investments. Similarly, the 
desire to attract businesses to Singapore necessitates frameworks that are familiar to the 
international business community which leads to a tension with autochthony. 
 Amidst a global trend of greater competition for mobile capital,240 Singapore has been 
under heavy pressure to adjust to market demands. Key points include the shift from a merit-
based to a disclosure-based regulatory system in 1997, and the move to allow DCS structures 
to list in Singapore in 2016, both changes which were most likely brought about as a response 
to changes in the regulatory regimes of foreign jurisdictions.  
 SCL has undergone several cycles where the influence of foreign jurisdictions has 
varied. From 1967- 1985, the heavy reliance on foreign investment meant that Singapore had 
to be particularly responsive to developments in foreign jurisdictions. However, this did not 
translate into changes in SCL because the vast majority of foreign companies were either 
subsidiaries of companies that were based overseas or preferred to seek debt financing from 
overseas markets.241 Singapore’s SCL framework was already comparable to that in the UK 
and to a lesser extent, Australia. There was little focus on regulations and safeguards for 
capital markets in Singapore. In a growing economy, insolvency was not seen as an area of 
concern. 
 The period following the Pan-El Crisis and the recession in 1985 marked a relative 
decline in the influence of foreign laws and economic events, and a rise in the influence of 
domestic political and economic events. In particular, the Pan-El Crisis meant that SCL had 
to address the deficiencies in its regulatory structure for capital markets. While SCL certainly 
looked to foreign jurisdictions for ideas on how to improve its regulatory framework, 
domestic events were the trigger for such studies. In terms of insolvency, the 1985 recession 
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prompted an urgent re-examination of the creditor-friendly insolvency regime, which 
threatened to bankrupt numerous businesses which were still viable  
 As a result of the 1985 recession, Singapore looked to the financial sector as a 
potential means of growth. A large capital market had to be established and Parliament had to 
consider how to woo foreign investors to Singapore. However, by 1993, Singapore’s 
regulatory regime was still considered to be significantly more restrictive than that of any 
other Asian securities market.242 Increasing competition from neighbouring countries at the 
time forced Singapore to reform her regulatory regime yet again, marking a revival of foreign 
influences in SCL. This culminated in the significant shift from a merit-based to a disclosure-
based regulatory system in 1997. The continuance of the dominance of foreign influence can 
be seen from the decision to allow DCS structures to list in Singapore in 2016. Moving 
forward, the desire of the Singapore Exchange to continue courting mainland Chinese and 
Southeast Asian companies to list in Singapore suggests that foreign laws and economic 
events will once again dominate in their influence of the future direction of SCL.  
 The other sector of potential growth Singapore is looking into is that of insolvency 
services and the development of Singapore into an insolvency hub. Given the need to offer an 
internationally-familiar insolvency framework, Singapore has adopted large portions of the 
United States Chapter 11 provisions in its latest reforms to its insolvency regime. The fact 
that it has done so despite the recommendations of the ILRC243 shows the extent which 
foreign influence has had on SCL.  
 The one area where foreign laws and economic events have had very little influence is 
that of directors’ duties. Then again, very little has changed in this area over the years. There 
has been much discussion over potential reforms periodically, but the inertia in this area 
appears to be strong and the lack of any major issue arising from any potential deficiencies in 
the law here has meant that Parliament is reluctant to disrupt the status quo. That being said, 
the influence of domestic political and economic events can be seen in this area of SCL, since 
the refusal to amend the provisions on directors’ duties can be said to stem by local fears that 
this might send the wrong signal and encourage misconduct.  
 On the whole, however, the clearest patterns in the development of SCL over time has 
been the periodic waxing and waning influences of foreign and domestic laws and events. At 
the present moment, the trend in the majority of areas of SCL very much appears to be the 
rising influence of foreign laws and economic events. In an increasingly competitive world, 
this is completely understandable given Singapore’s small size. The need to constantly ensure 
that Singapore is an attractive trading partner and investment destination is likely to persist 
for the foreseeable future and future developments in SCL are likely to continue to be heavily 
influenced by the developments of overseas jurisdictions. While SCL remains autochthonous 
insofar as Parliament independently decides which foreign laws to adopt, global pressures 
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mean that Parliament is considerably limited by foreign factors in shaping the overall 
framework of SCL. 
 
I. Fifty Years Ahead: Singapore Company Law and the Economy 
Predicting the future can be a particularly tricky task, but the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (“MAS”) seems to have a plan mapped out for Singapore. The Managing Director 
of the MAS, Ravi Menon predicts that from 2026 to 2040, Singapore’s economy will 
predominantly be driven by the export of capital and people, with widespread use of 
technology and increased focus on the ideas economy.244 SCL would have to adapt to the 
new economic climate by pre-empting these changes and creating the necessary legal 
frameworks well in advance of them. One question is whether the types of companies 
traditionally found in the Companies Act such as exempt private companies and companies 
limited by guarantee are sufficient to provide the flexibility that businesses today demand. 
This in turn is linked to the broader issue of how to make corporate legislation continue to be 
‘fit for purpose‘, including the optimal balance between regulation and its associated costs. 
The export of capital and people would also necessarily require strong corporate governance 
and capital markets practices in Singapore ensuring that the headquarters and/or hubs based 
in Singapore are stable, efficient and resistant to fraud and dishonest practices. The use of 
software in regulation like automated auditing technology and spot-checking software could 
boost efficiency and pre-empt possible problems.  
 Insolvency could be one of the major areas for economic growth in Singapore, with a 
world-class insolvency hub based in Singapore, at the forefront of international insolvency 
practices. Regulation and the protection of interested parties would have to be flexible 
enough to attract investments to one of the world’s leading bourses, located in Singapore, 
while a strong disclosure regime coupled with a well drafted statutory derivative action ready 
to protect minority shareholders. Directors’ duties should continue to evolve with the times, 
with periodic updates and partial codifications of common law duties to enhance legal 
certainty. Directors’ criminal liability should be well-structured to ensure a fair and 
proportionate penalty regime, which would assuage the fear of honest directors going to jail 
for minor regulatory offences, while acting as a suitable deterrent against fraudulent 
activities.  
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